Abstract: User's password verification information stored on the server is main point of vulnerability and remains attractive target for attacker. Proposed protocol uses two-server architecture so that password verification information is distributed between two servers known as authentication server and control server. In this paper, we present single sign-on (SSO) password-based multi-server authentication protocol that issues the ticket to the user for a specific time period. Ticket issued for one authentication server can be used by the peer user for its authentication to another authentication server that is under the control of same control server. It distributes password verification information between the authentication server and the control server based on peer-to-peer (P2P) computing. Therefore, the proposed protocol is more resistant to dictionary attack as compared to existing single-server password based authentication protocols. The proposed protocol does not use public key that causes computation and communication burden in resource constraint environment.
Introduction
Internet is a huge source of information and requires access control so that valuable information is accessible only to the authorised users. Therefore, it is essential to authenticate the identity of remote users. Password is the most extensively used authentication technique for the user's authentication. SSO provides an environment in which the users sign in once and are able to access the services offered by different servers under the same administrative control. It allows the user to enter the identity SSO password-based multi-server authentication protocol and password once within a specific time period to login on to multiple hosts and applications within an organisation. This single login capability provides a unified view of each user's interactions in the organisation and improving the quality of the services provided by that organisation. This concept is used in accessing low risk information from multiple applications by authenticating the user to the server only once for a specific time period. On the other hand, high risk applications require complimentary strong authentication techniques like digital certificates, security tokens, smart cards and biometrics.
The web server uses cookies for maintaining the information related to its clients to keep track of the client state. It provides a mechanism to pass the information between the user's computer and the service provider web server. The web server creates a cookie containing information related to the user and stores it on the user's computer that is accessed by the web server in subsequent login request from the same user. The web server can choose different information fields related to the user and store it inside the cookie.
Window Live ID (passport) is a single sign-on (SSO) and one of the largest dedicated authentication service provided by Microsoft on the web. This authentication service manages accounts of all Hotmail and MSN Messenger users. A passport enabled website does not need to handle the authentication itself and requires a user to use just one password for a group of sites. These websites delegate the task of user's authentication to Window Live ID which decides about the authenticity of the user that wants to sign in. Window Live ID issues a ticket to the user after verification that contains passport unique identity (PUID) and timestamp of last sign-in. This ticket is encrypted with a key that Window Live ID shared with the website that requires authentication. Received ticket is decrypted by the website using its key shared with the Window Live ID to recognise the user from PUID and then check the authentication that occurred within a certain time period. These tickets are cached using the cookies so they can be used for a specific valid time period. Cookies are domain specific and hence the web servers can store tickets belonging to various domains as different cookies on the user's computer. Window Livecomparison of the cost and functionality of the proposed protocol with the other related protocols is shown in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related work
In 2000, Ford and Kaliski (2000) proposed the first multi-server password-based authentication protocol that splits a password among multiple servers. This protocol generates a strong secret using password based on the communications exchanges with two or more independent servers. The attacker cannot compute the strong secret unless all the servers are compromised. This protocol is highly computation intensive due to the use of public keys by the servers. Moreover, the user requires a prior secure authentication channel with the server. Therefore, in 2001, Jablon (2001) improved this protocol and proposed multi-server password authentication protocol in which the servers do not use public keys and the user does not require prior secure communication channels with the servers. In 2001, Li et al. (2001) proposed a remote password authentication protocol for multi-server environment. This password authentication scheme is a pattern classification system based on an artificial neural network. The user has to register with registration centre once and then can obtain services from multiple servers without needing to register individually with each server. The users can choose their passwords freely and the server does not require to keep any verification table. This protocol can withstand the replay attack effectively but it requires intensive communication and computation efforts.
In 2003, Lin et al. (2003) proposed a multi-server authentication protocol based on the ElGamal digital signature scheme that uses simple geometric properties of the Euclidean and discrete logarithm problem concept. The server does not require to keep any verification table but the use of public keys makes this protocol computation intensive. In 2003, Raimondo and Gennaro (2003) proposed two multi-server password authentication protocols in which the user has to communicate in parallel with all authentication servers. They proved that these protocols are provable secure in the standard model. The attacker has to compromise minimum threshold number of servers to gain any meaningful information regarding the password of the user. These two protocols differ in the way the client interacts with the different servers. In these protocols, the servers are equally exposed to the user as well as to the attacker. In 2003, Brainard et al. (2003) proposed a password-based two-server authentication protocol in which only one server was exposed to the users. The use of public keys makes this system computationally intensive. Moreover, it uses secure socket layer (SSL) to establish a session key between a user and the front-end server to provide authentication but it provides only unilateral authentication.
In 2004 , Juang (2004 proposed a smart card-based multi-server authentication protocol using symmetric encryption algorithm without maintaining any verification table on the server. In 2004, Chang and Lee (2004) improved Juang's protocol and proposed a smart card-based multi-server authentication protocol using symmetric encryption algorithm without any verification table. Their protocol is more efficient than the multi-server authentication protocol of Juang (2004) . In 2007, Hu et al. (2007) proposed an efficient password authentication key agreement protocol for multi-server architecture in which the user can access multiple servers using smart card and one weak password.
The client and the server authenticate each other and agree on a common secret session key. The proposed protocol is more efficient and more user friendly than that of Chang and Lee (2004 ) protocol. In 2004 , Tsaur et al. (2004 proposed a smart card-based multi-server authentication protocol that uses the RSA cryptosystem and Lagrange interpolating polynomial without using any password verification table. This protocol involves high communication and computation costs. In 2005, Yang et al. (2005) proposed two-server based password authentication and key exchange protocol in which the back-end control server is managed by an enterprise head quarter and each affiliating organisation operates a front-end external server. The back-end control server requires public key for its operations. The attacker has to compromise both the servers simultaneously to launch offline dictionary attack.
In 2006, Yang et al. (2006) proposed a password-based user authentication and key exchange protocol using two-server architecture in which only a front-end server communicates directly with the users and a control server does not interact with the users directly. The concept of distributing the password verification information and authentication functionality into two servers requires additional efforts from an attacker to compromise two servers to launch successful offline dictionary attack. In 2006, Mackenzie et al. (2006) proposed an efficient password-authenticated key exchange protocol that uses a set of servers with known public keys so that a certain threshold number of servers must participate to authenticate a user. Therefore, the attacker has to compromise the minimum threshold number of servers to launch offline dictionary attack. The use of public key makes this protocol computation intensive. In 2008, Tsai (2008) proposed a multi-server authentication protocol using smart cards based on the nonce and one-way hash function that does not require to store any verification table on the server and the registration centre. The proposed authentication protocol is efficient as compared to other such related protocols because it does not use any symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithm for its implementation. In 2009, Liao and Wang (2009) proposed a dynamic identity-based remote user authentication protocol using smart cards to achieve user's anonymity. This protocol uses only hash function to implement a strong authentication for the multi-server environment. It provides a secure method to update the user's password without the help of trusted third party. In 2009, Hsiang and Shih (2009) found that Liao and Wang's protocol is susceptible to insider attack, masquerade attack, server spoofing attack, registration centre spoofing attack and is not reparable. Furthermore, it fails to provide mutual authentication. To remedy these flaws, Hsiang and Shih proposed an improvement over Liao and Wang's protocol. However, Hsiang and Shih protocol is also found to be flawed for replay attack, impersonation attack and stolen smart card attack.
Cookies are obscure to the users and are completely controlled by the web server. Therefore, cookies are good choice for a SSO solution. In 1999, Samar (1999) suggested SSO using HTTP cookies for web-based environment. He suggested three approaches namely centralised cookie server, decentralised cookie server and centralised login server to provide SSO for web applications. The client can choose any of the three SSO solutions depending upon the requirements of web application in terms of deployability, performance and management. In 2000, Park and Sandhu (2000) suggested address-based (IP_Cookie), password-based (Pswd_Cookie) and digital signature (Sign_Cookie)-based secure cookies for the user authentication. They suggested different set of inter dependent cookies such as name cookie, life cookie, password cookie and seal cookie. The role server issues one or more cookies by storing it on the client's computer. As the client connects to the web server, the relevant cookies are transmitted to the web server. Any of the web servers that accept these cookies verifies the cookie and provides the access of resources depending upon the role of the cookie. These secure cookies are used for user authentication especially in e-commerce transactions on the web.
In 2008, Wu et al. (2008) proposed SSO anti-phishing technique based on encrypted cookie that defeats phishing and pharming attacks. It encrypts the sensitive data with the server's public key and stores this cookie on the user's computer. This encrypted cookie scheme (ECS) has advantage that the user can ignore SSL indicator in online transaction procedure. Microsoft's Window Live ID initiative (Microsoft Passport, 2009 ) is a cookie-based password management system. This service authenticates the user to different websites that are under the control of this centralised system. The main limitations of this approach are that the users have to trust the centralised server and it requires web administration changes on those sites that use this system for its authentication (Kormann and Rubin, 2000) . Wallach (2002) classified the P2P networks as structured or unstructured. Structured P2P networks employ a globally consistent protocol to ensure that any node can efficiently route a search to some peer that has the desired file. Such a guarantee necessitates a more structured pattern of overlay links. Unstructured P2P networks do not provide any algorithm for organisation or optimisation of network connections. In particular, three models of unstructured architecture are defined. In pure P2P systems, the entire network consists solely of equipotent peers such as file sharing system. There is only one routing layer, as there are no preferred nodes with any special infrastructure function. Hybrid P2P systems allow privileged infrastructure nodes termed as supernodes. In centralised P2P systems, a central server is used for indexing functions and to bootstrap the entire system. Our proposed protocol in the next section follows the centralised P2P system. Wallach (2002) discussed different security issues in P2P network such as fairness and trust among participating nodes. A secure P2P network requires extensive analysis and careful design to guarantee scalability and efficiency. The other security issues in P2P network are to find and eject misbehaving node from P2P network. The other security concerns are in storage management, distributed auditing and trust among P2P nodes. Our proposed protocol in next section addresses all these security issues of P2P network and hence can be provide effective security in P2P network.
Proposed protocol
Most of the password-based user authentication protocols use single authentication server to store passwords or passwords verifier information. The attacker can compromise the authentication server and subject it to dictionary attack to find out the passwords of various users. The proposed SSO protocol uses two-server paradigm and hence is more secure against offline dictionary attack mounted on either of the two servers because the password verification information is distributed between two servers. This protocol can be used to strengthen existing single-server password system. The protocol is simple and fast if the user is using a valid ticket and correct passwords corresponding to the authentication server and the control server as shown in Figures 1 and 2 . The notations used in this section are listed in Table 1 . The proposed protocol provides password-based SSO authentication using two servers namely authentication server (AS) and control server (CS). The legitimate user can authenticate itself to AS i and CS using previously shared passwords. After successful authentication, CS first generates and stores a ticket in its database and then issues this ticket to the AS i , through which the user has requested the ticket. The validity time period (EXP_TIME) for this ticket is decided by the CS. AS i checks the authenticity of the ticket and then stores the ticket in its database and forwards it as cookie to the user's computer. The user checks the validity of the received message and after verification it stores the received ticket as cookie on its computer. Then, the user uses the same ticket for succeeding login attempts to same or different authentication servers which are under the control of same CS. This protocol has four phases.
1
Registration phase: when a user U i wants to become a legitimate client, the user U i has to submit its identity ID i and password PS i to AS i , and identity ID i and password P i to the CS independently via a secure communication channel. Then, these servers choose and compute some security parameters and store them on their databases. A user has to register to CS once and independently to different AS i .
2
Login and ticket request phase: when a user U i wants to get the valid ticket from the server CS, the user U i sends its identity and valid password verifier information to AS i . AS i extracts its own password information from the received message and forwards the modified message to CS. CS verifies the password verification information from its database for the server AS i 's and the user U i 's authentication. Once the authentication among the user U i , AS i and CS completes then the CS issues the ticket to the AS i . Afterwards, AS i verifies the authenticity of the ticket. Then AS i stores and forwards the ticket to the user U i . Finally, the user U i verifies the authenticity of the ticket and stores it as cookie on its computer. The user U i can use this ticket to get the services of the AS i and CS in any succeeding login attempt on to these servers.
3 Authentication phase: the user U i can use this valid ticket to authenticate itself to AS i . The user U i can also use the same ticket for its authentication to different authentication servers which are under the control of same CS.
4 Password change phase: the user U i has to authenticate itself to respective server AS i or CS before changing the password.
Registration phase
The user U i sends its identity ID i and password P i to the CS via a secure communication channel for its registration.
Step 1 U i → CS: ID i , P i CS has already stored OTP ⊕ H(X) in its master database. CS does not need to remember the OTP and can retrieve it from OTP ⊕ H(X) because CS knows its private key X. CS encrypts the password P i of the user U i using its private key X and one time secret OTP as P i ⊕ H(OTP | X) to defend the password P i from stolen verifier attack and stores Step
The server AS i encrypts the password PS i of the user U i using its private key Y i and SK i as PS i ⊕ Y i ⊕ SK i to defend the password PS i from stolen verifier attack and stores PS i ⊕ Y i ⊕ SK i corresponding to the user's identity ID i in its database.
Login and ticket request phase
The user U i chooses random nonce value N,
and sends ID i , G i , Z i , T to the AS i to get the valid ticket, where T is current date and time of the user's computer.
Step
After receiving the login request from the user U i , the service provider server AS i checks the validity of the time-stamp T by checking (T′ -T) < = δT where T′ is current date and time of the server AS i and δT is permissible time interval for a transmission delay. Afterwards, AS i extracts PS i from PS i ⊕ Y i ⊕ SK i corresponding to the user U i 's identity ID i from its database. Then the AS i generates random nonce value N i , computes
Step 2 AS i → CS:
CS checks the validity of timestamp T by checking (T″ -T) < = δT where T″ is current date and time of server CS and δT is permissible time interval for a transmission delay. CS extracts OTP from OTP ⊕ H(X) and then extracts P i from P i ⊕ H(OTP | X) corresponding to the user's identity ID i from its client's database and also extracts SK i from SK i ⊕ H(X | OTP) corresponding to authentication server identity AS i from its authentication server's database. Then, CS computes Once the received message is authenticated then CS generates a new ticket H(N′ | EXP_TIME) and stores H(N′ | EXP_TIME), EXP_TIME and N′ ⊕ H(X | P i ) corresponding to the user's identity ID i and P i ⊕ H(OTP | X) in its client's database, where N′ is a random nonce value chosen by CS. Then, CS computes
and sends C i , EXP_TIME and M i to AS i .
Step 3 CS → AS i :
and then compares the computed value of i C′ with received value of C i . This equivalency authenticates the legitimacy of CS and authenticity of the received message. After successful authentication, AS i stores N″, H(N′ | EXP_TIME) and EXP_TIME corresponding to the user U i 's identity ID i and PS i ⊕ Y i ⊕ SK i in its database. Here, the value of N″ is set equal to N′, when the ticket is initially issued to the user U i . Then, AS i computes Q i = N′ ⊕ H(PS i ), R i = H(N′ | PS i ) and sends Q i , R i and EXP_TIME to the user U i .
Step 4 AS i → U i : Q i , R i , EXP_TIME
The user U i knows PS i and can extract N′ from
and then verifies i R′ with the received value of R i to check the legitimacy of AS i . After verification, the user U i computes the ticket information C i = H(N′ | EXP_TIME) ⊕ N″ and stores the ticket information C i , EXP_TIME, H(PS i ) ⊕ N″ ⊕ H(P i ) as cookie on its computer corresponding to the server AS i . Here, the value of N″ is set equal to N′, when the ticket is initially issued to the user U i .
Authentication phase
The user U i extracts the value of N″ from H(PS i ) ⊕ N″ ⊕ H(P i ), which is stored as the cookie corresponding to AS i . The user U i uses the cookie information corresponding to AS i to generate the message ID i , C i ⊕ H(PS i | N″), EXP_TIME and sends it to AS i .
Step 
and then compares it with the extracted ticket information H(N′ | EXP_TIME) to check the authenticity of the user U i . After each successful authentication of the user U i to AS i , AS i updates the ticket information as N″ new = N″ + 1 corresponding to the user U i 's identity ID i , PS i ⊕ Y i ⊕ SK i , H(N′ | EXP_TIME) and EXP_TIME in its database. Afterwards, AS i computes
) and sends F i to the user U i .
verifies the computed value of i F ′ with the received value of F i to check the legitimacy of AS i . After successful verification, the user U i updates the value of N″ to N″ new in its cookie information corresponding to the authentication server AS i . Therefore, the user U i updates its cookie information corresponding to AS i as:
after each successful login attempt by the user U i . Finally, the user U i and the server AS i agree on common session key SS i = H[PS i | (N″ -1)]. Afterwards, all the subsequent messages between the user U i and the server AS i are XOR ed with this session key. Therefore, either the user U i or the server AS i can retrieve the original messages between themselves because both of them know this common session key.
Ticket-based re-authentication phase
The user U i uses the same ticket corresponding to AS i for its authentication to another authentication server AS k by computing
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and then sends ID i , EXP_TIME, B k , T to AS k , where T is current date and time of the user's computer.
Step 1 U i → AS k : ID i , EXP_TIME, B k , T After receiving the ticket request from the user U i , service provider server AS k checks the validity of timestamp T by checking (T′ -T) < = δT where T′ is current date and time of the server AS k and δT is permissible time interval for a transmission delay. Afterwards, AS k extracts PS k from PS k ⊕ Y k ⊕ SK k corresponding to the user's identity ID i from its database. Then AS k generates random nonce value N k , computes (
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Step 2 AS k → CS:
CS checks the validity of timestamp T by checking (T″ -T) < = δT, where T″ is current date and time of the server CS and δT is permissible time interval for a transmission delay. CS computes OTP from OTP ⊕ H(X) and extracts H(N′ | EXP_TIME), EXP_TIME, N′ ⊕ H(X | P i ) and P i ⊕ H(OTP | X) corresponding to the user U i 's identity ID i from its client's database and extracts SK k from SK k ⊕ H(X | OTP) corresponding to authentication server's identity AS k from its authentication server's database. Then, CS verifies the received EXP_TIME with extracted value of EXP_TIME to check the validity of the ticket. Afterwards, CS computes
verifies it with the extracted ticket information H(N′ | EXP_TIME) to check the authenticity of the user U i . After checking the legitimacy of the user U i , CS computes
and sends C i , EXP_TIME and M k to AS k .
Step 3 CS → AS k :
and then compares the computed value of i C′ with received value of C i . This equivalency authenticates the legitimacy of CS and authenticity of the received message. After successful authentication, AS k stores N″, H(N′ | EXP_TIME) and EXP_TIME corresponding to the user U i 's identity ID i and PS k ⊕ Y k ⊕ SK k in its database. Here the value of N″ is set equal to N′, when the ticket is initially issued to the user U i through the server AS k . Then, AS k computes Q i = N′ ⊕ H(PS k ), R i = H(N′ | PS k ) and sends Q i , R i and EXP_TIME to the user U i .
Step 4 AS k → U i : Q i , R i , EXP_TIME The user U i knows PS k and can extract N′ from
and then verifies the computed value of i R′ with the received value of R i to check the legitimacy of the AS k . After verification, the user U i computes the ticket information C i = H(N′ | EXP_TIME) ⊕ N″ and stores the ticket information C i , EXP_TIME, H(PS k ) ⊕ N″ ⊕ H(P i ) as cookie on its computer corresponding to the authentication server AS k . In this way, the user U i uses a valid ticket meant for one authentication server AS i to authenticate itself to another authentication server AS k .
Password change phase
Protocol shown in Figure 3 is used by the user U i to change its password with authentication server AS i . The user U i extracts N″ from H(PS i ) ⊕ N″ ⊕ H(P i ) and then H(N′ | EXP_TIME) from valid ticket information stored on the user U i 's computer corresponding to authentication server AS i as H(N′ | EXP_TIME) = C i ⊕ N″. Afterwards, the user U i computes 
Protocol shown in Figure 4 is used by the user U i to change its password with CS. The user U i extracts N″ from H(PS i ) ⊕ N″ ⊕ H(P i ) and then H(N′ | EXP_TIME) from any valid ticket stored on the user U i 's computer, which has been issued by CS corresponding to the user U i 's identity ID i . Then the user U i computes
and sends ID i , E i , L i and EXP_TIME to CS. CS extracts H(N′ | EXP_TIME), EXP_TIME, N′ ⊕ H(X | P i ) and P i ⊕ H(OTP | X) corresponding to the user U i 's identity ID i . CS verifies the received EXP_TIME with extracted value of EXP_TIME to check the validity of the ticket and computes 
Security analysis
The concept of two-tier authentication for the user makes it difficult for the attacker to guess out information pertaining to passwords and tickets. There may be a possibility that the ticket can be stolen by the attacker from the client's computer using plug-ins or other means. The dynamic nature of ticket makes it difficult for the attacker to find out any meaningful information from the eavesdropped messages. Moreover, the lifetime (EXP_TIME) of the ticket makes it valid for a limited time period as determined by the risk tolerance of the control server. A good password authentication scheme should have protection from different possible attacks relevant to that protocol.
Ticket theft
The attacker can steal the ticket C i = H(N′ | EXP_TIME) ⊕ N″, EXP_TIME and H(PS i ) ⊕ N″ ⊕ H(P i ) from the client's computer using plug-ins or other means. Then he tries to login on to corresponding authentication server AS i or AS k using this stolen ticket. Even after getting the valid ticket, the attacker has to guess at least two parameters out of PS i , PS k , N″ and P i correctly at the same time to compute the value of
It is not possible to simultaneously guess two parameters correctly in real polynomial time. Moreover, the value of N″ is changed to N″ + 1 after each successful login attempt by the user U i on to corresponding authentication server AS i or AS k . Therefore, the stolen ticket becomes useless if the user U i login successfully on to corresponding authentication server AS i or AS k after ticket theft from the client's computer.
Ticket poisoning attack
The attacker may attempt to replace the valid ticket information
and H(PS i ) ⊕ N″ ⊕ H(P i ) with some random values so that AS i or user U i stores wrong ticket information. In the proposed protocol, the server AS i or the user U i verifies the authenticity of received ticket information before updating the ticket information in their database. Since ticket information
Hence, both AS i and user U i checks out the validity of ticket before storing or updating it in their databases. Therefore, the proposed protocol is free from ticket poisoning attack.
Ticket independence
The attacker cannot compute a future ticket from any previous ticket related to the same user U i . Any valid ticket is stored as C i = H(N′ | EXP_TIME) ⊕ N″, EXP_TIME and H(PS i ) ⊕ N″ ⊕ H(P i ) on the user's computer. Future ticket of the user U i corresponding to same authentication server AS i contains incremented value of N″ as (N″ + 1) and hence the attacker cannot compute future tickets from current tickets because the attacker requires to know at least two parameters out of PS i , N″ and P i correctly at the same time to generate the valid future tickets. It is not possible to simultaneously guess two parameters correctly in real polynomial time. Moreover, tickets of the same user for different authentication servers are different from each other.
Online dictionary attack
In this type of attack, the attacker pretends to be a legitimate user and attempts to login on to the server by guessing different words as password from a dictionary. In the proposed protocol, the attacker has to get valid ticket corresponding to the authentication server AS i or AS k . Even after getting the valid ticket, the attacker has to guess at least two parameters out of PS i , PS k , N″ and P i correctly at the same time to compute the value of
It is not possible to simultaneously guess two parameters correctly in real polynomial time. Moreover, the attacker cannot compute password from messages generated from CS to AS i and vice-versa. The attacker has to know PS i and P i correctly at the same time to request the fresh ticket from CS. It is not possible to guess out two parameters correctly at the same time in real polynomial time. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against online dictionary attacks.
Offline dictionary attack
In offline dictionary attack, the attacker can record messages and attempts to guess user's passwords and ticket related information from recorded messages. The attacker first tries to obtain some password verification information such as Figure 4 . Now, the attacker has to guess at least two parameters correctly out of PS i , PS k , P i , N″, N′, New_PS i and New_P i at the same time. It is not possible to simultaneously guess two parameters correctly in real polynomial time. Also, the value of N″ is changed to (N″ + 1) after each successful authentication by the user U i to AS i . Moreover, the user U i , the server AS i and the server CS choose random nonce values as N, N i and N′ during fresh ticket request. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against offline dictionary attack.
Eavesdropping attack
In this type of attack, the attacker listens to all the communication between the user and the server and then tries to find out PS i , P i , N″ and N′ values. The user U i sends ID i ,
CS. An eavesdropper has to guess at least two parameters correctly out of PS i , P i , N, N″ and SK i at the same time. It is not possible to simultaneously guess two parameters correctly in real polynomial time in all four protocols shown in Figures 1 to 4 . Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against eavesdropping attack.
Denial of service attack
In denial of service attack, the server is cheated by the attacker to update false verification information for next login phase and hence legitimate user cannot login successfully in subsequent login request to the server. AS i updates the value of N″ to (N″ + 1) in its database after authenticating the ticket information H(N′ | EXP_TIME) and password PS i as shown in Figure 1 . The legitimate user U i can change the password with AS i using the protocol shown in Figure 3 if the user U i provides valid ticket information as H(N′ | EXP_TIME), password PS i and N″ correctly at the same time. Also, the legitimate user U i can change the password with CS using the protocol shown in Figure 4 if the user U i provides valid ticket information as H(N′ | EXP_TIME) and password P i correctly at the same time. Therefore, the attacker cannot launch denial of service attack on the proposed protocol.
Man-in-the-middle attack
In this type of attack, the attacker intercepts the messages sent between the client and the server and replay these intercepted messages with in the valid time frame window. An attacker can act as a client to the server or vice-versa with recorded messages.
In the proposed protocol, the attacker can intercept the login request message ID i ,
, EXP_TIME from the user U i to its respective authentication server AS i . Then, he starts a new session with the server AS i by sending a login request by replaying the login request message
, EXP_TIME. The attacker can authenticate itself to server AS i as well as to legitimate user U i but cannot compute the common session key
] because the attacker does not know the value of PS i and N″. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attack.
Replay attack
In this type of attack, the attacker first listens to communication between the client and the server and then tries to imitate the user to login on to the server by resending the captured messages transmitted between the client and the server. Replaying the message
, EXP_TIME from the user U i to its respective authentication server AS i can be detected by AS i because the value of N″ is changed to (N″ + 1) after each successful login attempt by the user U i to AS i . Similarly, replayed message from AS i to user U i can also be detected by the user U i because that message contains verifier information as
). Moreover, the attacker cannot compute the common session key SS i = H[PS i | (N″ -1)] because the attacker does not know the value of PS i and N″. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against message replay attack.
Leak of verifier attack
In this type of attack, the attacker may be able to steal verification table from the server. In the proposed protocol, two servers are used and the attacker has to steal information from two servers simultaneously. Moreover, passwords are encrypted with the private keys (Y i and SK i or X and OTP) of the servers. Also, AS i is updating the value of N″ stored in its database to (N″ + 1) after each successful authentication by the user U i to AS i . In case verifier is stolen by breaking into the AS i 's database, the attacker cannot calculate the user's passwords PS i because the user's passwords is stored as PS i ⊕ Y i ⊕ SK i and the attacker does not know the private key Y i and SK i of the server AS i . In case verifier is stolen by breaking into the server's CS database, the attacker cannot calculate the user's passwords P i because the user's passwords is stored as P i ⊕ H(OTP | X) and the attacker does not know the private key OTP and X of CS. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against leak of verifier attack.
Brute force attack
To launch brute force attack, the attacker first obtains some password verification information such as H (PS i Figure 4 . Even after recording these messages, the attacker has to guess minimum two parameters correctly out of PS i , PS k , P i , N′ and N″ at the same time. It is not possible to simultaneously guess two parameters correctly in real polynomial time. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against brute force attack.
Message modification or insertion attack
In this type of attack, the attacker modifies or inserts some messages on communication channel with the hope of discovering client's password or gaining unauthorised access. Modifying or inserting messages in proposed protocol can only cause authentication between the client and the server to fail but cannot allow the attacker to gain any information about client's passwords PS i , P i and ticket issued to that user. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against message modification or insertion attack. Table 2 Cost and functionality comparison among related multi-server authentication schemes
Proposed protocol Tsai (2008) Hu et al. (2007) Chang and 
Notes: E1 -memory needed for the cookie or smart card E2 -communication cost of the authentication E3 -computation cost of the user E4 -computation cost of the service provider server.
Cost and functionality analysis
An efficient authentication scheme must take communication and computation cost into consideration during the user's authentication. To best of our knowledge, only Samar (1999) suggested three general cookies-based SSO approaches namely centralised cookie server, decentralised cookie server and centralised login server to provide SSO for web applications. Most of the two-server authentication protocols are based on smart cards (Juang, 2004; Chang and Lee, 2004; Hu et al., 2007; Tsai, 2008) . The performance comparison of the proposed protocol with the smart card-based two-server authentication schemes is summarised in Table 2 ). The computation cost of proposed protocol is computed after the valid ticket is stored as cookie on the user's computer. In the proposed protocol, the parameters stored in the cookie are C i , EXP_TIME, H(PS i ) ⊕ N″ ⊕ H(P i ) and the memory needed (E1) is 384 (= 3 * 128) bits. The communication cost of authentication (E2) includes the capacity of transmitting message involved in the authentication scheme. The capacity of transmitting message {ID i , C i ⊕ H(PS i | N i ), EXP_TIME} and {F i } is 512 (= 4 * 128) bits. The computation cost of the user (E3) and the service provider server (E4) is the time spent by the user and the service provider server during the process of authentication. Therefore, the computation cost of the user is 5T H and that of the service provider server is 3T H . Table 2 shows that the proposed protocol is computationally efficient as compared to the related two-server authentication protocols.
Conclusions
Most of the password-based authentication protocols are designed for single-server environment. Users have to login each time to access different services of the remote servers. To solve this problem, we proposed an efficient SSO password-based two-server architecture in which the user has to login once to get a valid ticket. This valid ticket is used by the user for succeeding login attempts on same or different authentication server which is under the control of same control server. This time-bound ticket mechanism allows the legitimate user to login with less computational efforts in succeeding login attempts after getting the valid ticket from the authentication and the control server. The proposed protocol eliminates the main point of vulnerability as existing in most of the single-server password-based authentication protocols. The control server is not much exposed to the users as well as attackers and hence less prone to attack. Therefore, this architecture increases the overall security of the system and resiliency to dictionary attack. The proposed protocol splits a password into two passwords and the user has to remember one password for control server and different passwords for different authentication servers. This feature allows the users to have a strong password for CS and an easy to remember passwords for AS i and still have strong authentication because it is difficult for the attacker to guess both the passwords correctly at the same time. The proposed protocol has no compatibility problem with the single-server model as most of the existing password protocols use single server authentication architecture. Moreover, the proposed protocol does not use public key or symmetric key concept as is used in most of multi-server password-based authentication protocols. The proposed protocol is an attempt to bridge the gap between single server and multi-server password-based authentication protocols. The proposed protocol can be easily integrated into P2P networks to provide secure communication.
